Key facts
- Six months after U.S. and Israeli air strikes, Iran's military capabilities have been significantly damaged.
- Iran continues to exert leverage over the Strait of Hormuz, a critical global shipping lane.
- The U.S. is implementing an 'economic onslaught' of measures to isolate Iran.
- China's role is crucial, as it imports 80% of Iran's oil, though this is a smaller percentage of China's total imports.
- Iran's defense-industrial base has reportedly suffered 80-90% attrition.
- Russia and China are reportedly providing Iran with military and dual-use materials, raising concerns about secondary sanctions.
Six months after U.S. and Israeli air strikes initiated a conflict with Iran, the confrontation shows no clear end, despite significant damage to Iran's military capabilities. Experts suggest the next phase will be determined by Iran's ability to withstand economic pressure, the potential for diplomacy to translate military gains into a settlement, the future of the Strait of Hormuz, and the extent of rebuilding assistance from Russia and China.
Retired Vice Admiral Robert Harward described the situation as a 'steady state' but emphasized that time is Iran's biggest problem, with sustained economic pressure potentially becoming an internal threat. He noted that economic hardship fueled recent mass demonstrations. U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced an 'economic onslaught' of measures to further isolate Iran, which he plans to discuss with G20 finance ministers. Harward suggested that winter conditions could exacerbate the impact of this pressure, potentially affecting Iran's ability to fund state institutions and provide essential goods to its citizens.
China's role is central, with approximately 80% of Iran's exported oil going to China, although it constitutes only 12-13% of China's total crude imports. Elaine Dezenski of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies stated that if China were to cease purchasing Iranian oil, it would have a significant effect. Beijing has so far resisted U.S. pressure regarding its trade relationship with Tehran. Dezenski also highlighted that Iran's use of yuan for oil sales and transactions outside the U.S. dollar network could strengthen alternative financial infrastructure and erode the dollar's role in global energy markets.
While further military action is not ruled out, its effectiveness may be limited. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio indicated that Iran's defense-industrial base has suffered 80-90% attrition, with President Donald Trump estimating significant destruction of Iran's missile systems and navy. However, Iran has retained the capacity to disrupt shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Bradley Bowman of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies noted the U.S. struggle to convert battlefield success into sustainable political outcomes in the Middle East. He suggested that a lasting political transformation in Iran would require internal action, and Washington lacks the political will for a large-scale troop deployment. The conflict has also raised questions about U.S. weapons expenditure and available munitions.
There are mixed signals from Iran regarding diplomacy, with some elements reportedly delaying talks until after the U.S. midterm elections, while others emphasize the economic pain and the need for diplomatic revival. Professor Gawdat Bahgat views the Strait of Hormuz as Iran's primary remaining bargaining tool, with threats to close it potentially used even after a temporary agreement. The strait handles about one-fifth of the world's oil and LNG. Although UNCLOS guarantees transit passage, Iran has not ratified the treaty. Bowman argued that Iran can deter shipping through intermittent attacks, raising insurance costs and impacting Gulf states that cooperate with Washington, thereby turning them into leverage against the U.S.
Concerns also exist about external support for Iran's military recovery. Bowman cited Chinese shipments of chemical precursors and Russian targeting information and drone support as evidence of growing assistance, with Moscow potentially delivering Su-35 fighters and Beijing moving towards finished weapons. Such support, however, depends on Beijing and Moscow's assessment of U.S. responses, particularly the fear of secondary sanctions from the United States. A study led by Bowman documented 616 security cooperation incidents among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea between January 2019 and December 2025.