Key facts
- The 2015 Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) aimed to limit Iran's nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief.
- Key provisions included capping uranium enrichment at 3.67% for 15 years and limiting enriched uranium stockpile to 300 kg.
- The deal also restricted plutonium production and allowed extensive IAEA monitoring.
- The U.S. withdrew from the deal in 2018, reimposing sanctions.
- Iran began violating the terms in 2019, and UN sanctions were reimposed in 2025.
The U.S. is reportedly nearing a peace deal to end its three-month war with Iran, though the terms remain undisclosed. This potential agreement raises questions about how it would compare to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which offered Iran sanctions relief in exchange for limitations on its nuclear activities.
The JCPOA, signed by Iran and several world powers including the U.S., aimed to significantly increase the time Iran would need to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear bomb, extending it from a few months to a year. Iran has consistently maintained that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes.
In 2018, then-U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the agreement and reinstated sanctions. Iran subsequently began violating the terms of the deal in 2019. By 2025, United Nations sanctions were reimposed, effectively rendering the JCPOA defunct.
The main provisions of the 2015 deal included lifting sanctions on Iran's key economic sectors such as oil, gas, petrochemicals, banking, and shipping. The U.S. and EU also removed Iranian entities and individuals from sanctions lists and permitted sales of commercial aircraft and imports of Iranian carpets and food.
Regarding its nuclear program, Iran agreed to enrich uranium only up to 3.67% purity for 15 years, a level far below the approximately 90% required for a weapon and below the 20% it had previously achieved. The deal also capped Iran's enriched uranium stockpile at 300 kilograms, a reduction of 98% according to the U.S., and limited the number of centrifuges to 6,100 from around 19,000. Excess uranium was to be processed or exported. The underground Fordow enrichment facility was designated for research purposes only.
Furthermore, Iran committed to redesigning its heavy-water reactor in Arak to prevent the production of weapons-grade plutonium. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was granted broad inspection authority to verify compliance.