Key facts
- Iran's leaders are united on a strategy of enduring attacks but divided on the ultimate war objective.
- Ultra-hardliners seek total victory, while pragmatists aim for a negotiated settlement with the U.S.
- A recent ceasefire deal failed due to continued strikes and unfulfilled financial promises.
- Internal divisions are being amplified by state media and public sentiment.
- The economic toll of the war and social pressures are key concerns for the pragmatic camp.
Iran's leadership is presenting a unified front in its ongoing conflict, emphasizing its determination to withstand attacks from the U.S. and its allies. However, significant internal divisions are emerging regarding the ultimate objective of the war. On one side, ultra-hardliners, associated with the 'Paydari' movement, advocate for a complete victory and reject any negotiations with the United States. They are described as ideologues focused on enforcing the Islamic Republic's societal control.
Conversely, a more pragmatic faction, aligned with President Masoud Pezeshkian and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, views military pressure as a strategic tool to achieve a negotiated settlement with the U.S. This group is also motivated by concerns over the severe economic impact of the war on Iran and the necessity of adapting to evolving social dynamics within the country. An adviser to Qalibaf, Mahdi Mohammadi, stated on Telegram that negotiation is a political instrument complementing military action to compel concessions.
The open rivalry within Iran's leadership suggests a struggle for control over the nation's post-war direction. The stance of the new supreme leader, Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, who has reportedly been in hiding since an incident early in the war, remains a significant question mark, with both factions claiming his support.
In a development that bolstered the pragmatic camp, a ceasefire deal brokered in April received substantial backing from Iran's Supreme National Security Council, with only Saeed Jalili, a prominent hard-liner, believed to have voted against it. However, the ceasefire ultimately collapsed as both sides resumed trading strikes. Iran's pursuit of control over the Strait of Hormuz, a critical global oil and gas transit route, and its frustration over the non-materialization of financial benefits, such as the release of billions in frozen assets, contributed to the breakdown of the agreement and the re-establishment of the American blockade.
The hard-line faction has been actively leveraging state media, including IRIB, and nightly rallies to foster opposition to negotiations. They promote a narrative of impending total victory and denounce any compromise with the United States. Instances of state television cutting off live broadcasts of Qalibaf discussing negotiations and censoring President Pezeshkian's remarks about renewed U.S. talks before the former supreme leader's death highlight this media strategy.
President Pezeshkian and his supporters have countered by criticizing state television for exacerbating divisions within the country during wartime. The president's media office has accused the broadcaster of censoring him and other government officials, indicating an open rift. Hard-liners have also exerted influence through actions such as the brief closure of popular cafes in Tehran, which were seen as spaces where women flouted mandatory veiling laws and people mixed freely. These closures were interpreted as a signal of the growing influence of 'religious extremist parties'.
Despite being a minority, Jalili's supporters are considered influential due to their financial resources, power within the bureaucracy, and connections within the Revolutionary Guard. The pragmatic camp argues that maintaining national unity requires addressing public discontent over the economy, political repression, and social restrictions, especially as Iran faces a sliding currency, spiraling inflation, and rising unemployment. They believe a final agreement with the U.S. could yield substantial economic benefits through sanctions relief and the return of frozen assets.