Key facts
- The IAEA faces challenges in verifying Iran's nuclear compliance due to unclear details on inspection scope and access.
- A US-Iranian memorandum of understanding includes downblending of highly enriched uranium on-site under IAEA supervision.
- Experts express concern that Iran conducting the downblending itself could obscure the original quantity of enriched uranium.
- The current location of Iran's highly enriched uranium is unknown following strikes.
- Verification of any uranium enrichment suspension requires IAEA access to detect covert activities.
- Iran's past denial of access to certain sites has disrupted the IAEA's 'continuity of knowledge'.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) faces significant challenges in verifying Iran's nuclear nonproliferation commitments, with former officials and experts highlighting the critical need for clarity on the scale, scope, and degree of access for inspections.
Details regarding these inspections remain undetermined, though IAEA head Raffael Grossi has indicated that the UN body will soon work on modalities such as dates, procedures, and locations. Experts believe the IAEA likely has a plan for potential inspections, prioritizing areas where enriched uranium might be located. Laura Rockwood, a former IAEA negotiator, emphasized the importance of determining the location of enriched uranium, suggesting the agency has a plan for re-entry.
A key point of contention is the handling of Iran's highly enriched uranium (HEU) stocks. According to a US-Iranian memorandum of understanding, Iran's HEU is to be downblended on-site under IAEA supervision. However, Matthew Sharp, formerly of the US National Security Council, cautioned that if Iran conducts the downblending itself, it could obscure the original quantity of HEU, potentially leaving some material unaccounted for. The current location of Iran's approximately 450 kilograms of HEU is uncertain, possibly hidden or damaged by recent strikes.
Verifying Iran's adherence to any suspension on uranium enrichment is also crucial, requiring IAEA access to detect any covert nuclear activities. Kelsey Davenport of the Arms Control Association stated that enrichment suspension is meaningless without verifiable access. Experts suggest that once uranium is enriched to below 5 percent, it could be shipped out of Iran and stored under an international fuel bank, a scenario favored by US officials.
Lessons learned from past inspections, particularly the importance of the IAEA's Model Additional Protocol, are being considered. This protocol grants broader access to information and locations related to the entire nuclear fuel cycle. While Iran signed the protocol in 2003, it has not formally brought it into force, though it was provisionally implemented for periods. Rockwood noted past indications of Iranian noncompliance and expects future inspections to be a 'heavy slog' due to disruptions in the 'continuity of knowledge' caused by Iran's cessation of access to certain sites following recent strikes.