Key facts
- The US-sponsored regional order in the Middle East, established after the 1991 Gulf War, has collapsed.
- The Gaza conflict and Iran's direct missile attack on Israel are seen as final blows to this order.
- Regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Iran have restored relations through Chinese mediation, excluding Washington.
- Gulf states are expanding partnerships with Beijing and Moscow, with some joining BRICS.
- The US has struggled to restrain Israel and Iran, despite being the region's largest security guarantor.
- Egypt faces economic costs from the Gaza war, including spiking fuel and food prices and collapsing Suez Canal revenue.
A quarter-century after the 'war on terror' began, the American Middle East order has collapsed, according to Marc Lynch, a political science professor at George Washington University. In an essay for Foreign Affairs, Lynch argues that the regional order Washington has sponsored since 1991 has fallen, with the American-Israeli war with Iran serving as the final blow to a system that had been weakening for years.
The order, which took shape after the 1991 Gulf War, rested on dual military containment of Iran and Iraq and an unwritten bargain with Arab rulers: American security guarantees in exchange for silence over domestic repression and the Palestinian question. This arrangement, which did not require popular legitimacy, ultimately collapsed due to a lack of accountability, leading allies to take greater risks.
Examples cited include the war in Yemen, where Riyadh allegedly used American backing for a protracted conflict, and the Gaza campaign, where unconditional US protection allegedly provided Israel with a mandate for actions that have resulted in tens of thousands of civilian deaths. The perceived double standard in US foreign policy, defending Ukraine's sovereignty while supporting Israel's actions in Gaza, has eroded American moral authority, particularly in the Global South.
Recent events, including Israel's failure to secure its northern border against Hezbollah and the Houthis' disruption of Red Sea shipping, have further undermined the US's perceived deterrence capabilities. Iran's direct missile attack on Israel, which necessitated US intervention, highlighted Israel's dependence on American support and shattered a long-standing red line.
Lynch invokes the 1956 Suez crisis, when Britain and France lost regional influence, but notes that current regional hedging began before the 'death certificate' of the US order was written. The restoration of relations between Riyadh and Tehran in 2023, mediated by China, signaled a willingness by regional powers to resolve disputes through alternative channels. Gulf states have since increased partnerships with Beijing and Moscow, with some joining BRICS as a hedge against a future where American guarantees are no longer exclusive.
The article suggests that both Israel and Iran have an interest in maintaining regional instability. For Israel, ongoing conflict justifies settlement expansion and postpones accountability for its treatment of Palestinians. For Iran, perpetual tension serves to justify domestic repression and demonstrates its ability to challenge US allies and disrupt global trade routes like the Strait of Hormuz.
Gulf states, which had bet on US favoritism, now face a partner unable to protect them from attack or consult them before wars that affect them. The economic costs of these conflicts are borne by the region's populations, with Egypt experiencing spiking fuel and food prices and collapsing Suez Canal revenues due to the war.