Key facts
- EU countries have adopted a temporary regime allowing messaging services to voluntarily detect suspected child sexual abuse material until 2028.
EU countries have temporarily extended a regime allowing messaging services to voluntarily detect child sexual abuse material until April 3, 2028. End-to-end encrypted apps remain exempt from the measure.

The extension of the temporary measure provides a legal basis for platforms to combat child sexual abuse material while policymakers continue to negotiate a permanent solution, balancing online safety with privacy concerns.
European Union member states have confirmed a temporary framework that allows messaging services to voluntarily implement measures to detect suspected child sexual abuse material (CSAM), extending the regime until April 3, 2028. This decision preserves a carve-out for end-to-end encrypted messages, a feature previously secured by Members of the European Parliament (MEPs).
The EU ambassadors approved the written procedure for this temporary framework, which derogates from the bloc's rules on the privacy of electronic communications. The file was subsequently confirmed as adopted with 25 governments in favour, one against, and one abstaining. This confirmation aligns with the text previously passed in the European Parliament, which included an amendment exempting end-to-end encrypted services like WhatsApp and Signal.
The temporary measure has been a source of controversy, with privacy advocates labeling it "chat control" and warning about the potential for scanning private messages. The European Parliament had initially voted against prolonging the measure in March, leading to its lapse in April. However, European Parliament President Roberta Metsola reintroduced the file at the request of the European People's Party, leading to the recent vote for extension.
Despite the exclusion of end-to-end encrypted services, some MEPs remain critical. Birgit Sippel, the MEP who led the file, noted that while a majority wanted to limit the scope to known CSAM and include targeted measures, procedural constraints only allowed for highlighting the protection of end-to-end encryption. MEP Ignazio Marino argued that scanning private communications should be limited to specific suspects and that the law might be annulled by the Court of Justice.